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Introduction  
There is a well known tendency among American policymakers to declare metaphorical wars, 
perhaps the most well known of which was Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. Additionally we 
have seen declaration of hostilities against such foes as cancer (President Richard Nixon), 
illiteracy (both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush), and (to note this is not just a U.S. 
phenomenon), Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva recently declared war on hunger (to list 
but a few). 
If anything, such rhetorical declarations have the advantage of giving policy pronouncements an 
air of grave significance. Of course, while underscoring the gravity of an issue may help galvanize 
political action, the invocation of the war analogy also presupposes a chance at victory. Hence, 
the double-edged nature of this type of rhetoric: these types of wars are often foreordained to be 
lost, raising the wisdom of utilizing the formulation. 
The United States currently finds itself in two such “wars”—the War on Drugs (WoD) declared by 
President Nixon[2] and the much more recent Global War on Terror (WoT) declared by President 
Bush. Indeed, both are far more actual wars than those mentioned in the first paragraph, although 
both do share the characteristic common to all of these battles: they are aimed at nouns rather 
than an easily identifiable enemy. However, unlike a war on cancer or illiteracy, bullets are fired in 
the wars on drugs and terror. 
There is another connection to these two wars in that in some cases illegal drugs are being used 
to fund terrorist activities—a problem that is likely to grow over time. Indeed, in some cases these 
two wars have become almost merged, as in the South American state of Colombia. In others, 
like Afghanistan, the long-term linkages are difficult to ignore. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the intersection of these two “wars” by looking at two 
cases which fall into both: Colombia and Afghanistan. The purpose of this comparison is to detail 
the degree to which lessons can be learned about the current state of both politics and policy vis-
à-vis these two exceptionally important areas of U.S. foreign policy. 
This study examines the difficulty of dealing with the terms “terrorism” in the first main section and 
then moves to case-specific discussions of Colombia and Afghanistan. From there the 
implications of the confluence of drugs and terrorism are discussed in broader terms. It is the 
position of this article that the case of Colombia has some instructive (or, at a minimum, 
cautionary) elements for those who may be planning long term policy in Afghanistan and Central 
Asia. Further, it is argued herein that there is often a disconnect between more formal definitions 
of terrorism and the political usages of the term that can lead to policy sloppiness. Finally, the 
question is posed as to the degree to which the war on drugs is actually counter-productive vis-à-
vis the war on terror rather than necessarily being one in the same, as is the dominant view of 
U.S. policymakers. 
A Multi-Level Game 
Discussing terrorism is a difficult task, given the emotionally charged nature of the term. This 
problem is compounded several times over when one tries to deal with the term in a context 
which has academic, policy and political overtones (i.e., analytical, action-oriented, and rhetorical 
modes). Throw in the fact that these are not mutually exclusive categories (e.g., the academic 
can inform policy and politics and certainly there is a clear linkage between politics and policy) 
along with the fact that the general public responds with great emotion to the term, and one is 
tempted to toss the concept out the window and utilize different words. 
However, given the importance of the politics of language in this case, tossing out the term is not 
an option. Indeed, to understand the basic thesis of this paper one has to deal directly with the 
fact that political implications of the word “terrorism” is at the heart of public policy and of the 
comparison of Colombia and Afghanistan.   
An Academic Definition 
I would accept Cooper’s definition of the term as a useful starting point for a working academic 
definition of term. Cooper defined the term as follows: “[t]errorism is the intentional generation of 
massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other 
human beings.”[3] I would further add that terrorism is a tactic that is aimed primarily at non-
combatants for the purpose, typically, of securing the concession of a government. 
The tricky part then becomes defining who is a “terrorist” insofar as it is possible for terrorist 
tactics, as described above, to be employed by both regular and irregular armies, and by state 
actors and non-state actors. I would argue that a group is properly identified as terrorists when 
that group’s primary tool is the type of activity described above. If the main way by which a 
groups seeks power is through bombing of civilians, kidnapping and murder, and other relatively 
small-scale attacks that are designed to affect change not though military conquest, but by 
generating insecurity and fear in the non-combatant population, then that group is a terrorist 
group. 
The presupposition is that these groups engage in such terror tactics because they lack the ability 
to engage in direct warfare against their opponents. It is clear, for example, that a conventional 
military interchange between the Palestinians and the Israelis would lead to a decisive victory for 
Israel, hence the decision made by Arafat and the PLO to engage in a wholly asymmetric type of 
violent conflict. Similarly, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda could not have military stormed New 
York City and downed the towers of the World Trade Center, yet the terrorist tactics of hijackings 
combined with suicide flights were quite effective.[4] 
An additional element to the definition is that it is not just that the violence perpetrated is aimed at 
civilians or hopes to generate fear, but that such attacks are the primary, if not sole, method of 
operation in question. As Merari notes: “[i]f the definition of terrorism is equally applicable to 
nuclear war, conventional war and guerrilla, the term loses any useful meaning.”[5]   
The Politics of Terror 
There is no denying the inherently inflammatory and profoundly negative connotation of the word 
terrorism. As such, the term has deep political implications and usages. There really is no specific 
“political” definition of terror, rather it tends to be in the eye of the rhetorician. To put it somewhat 
glibly (yet still accurately): terrorism is whatever a given government wishes to call it. So, when 
there is violence that a state (or whomever) does not like, it calls it “terrorism” but when that 
violence is considered to the benefit of the state of group, then it is not terrorism. This semantic 
fact is especially true in the post-9/11 world, in which it sometimes seems that all political violence 
is defined within the rhetoric of terrorism. 
Not only is terming an opponent a “terrorist” a useful tool in terms of demonizing said opponent, it 
is also a useful turn of phrase when one is seeking funding. There is little doubt that now that the 
major focus of U.S. foreign and defense policies is the WoT, that funding is substantially linked to 
one’s place in that policy field. This is true in terms of defense budgets and in terms of foreign aid. 
For example: Iraq and Afghanistan both have become major recipients of U.S. aid dollars 
because of the Bush administration’s policies in the WoT. 
As will be discussed further below, the U.S.-Colombian relationship in terms of aid and military 
assistance has changed because of the added factor of politically-defined “terrorism.” The 
redefinition, to some substantial degree, of the ongoing conflict in that country has lead to an 
important shift in U.S. policy.[6] Additionally, the interest in the DEA and SOUTHCOM in terming 
the Colombian insurgents as “terrorists” underscores this transformation in thinking. As such, it is 
not unfair to think of terrorism as the “new communism” insofar as best way to receive additional 
funding (whether in terms of foreign aid or in terms of a line-item in the budget) is to be 
associated with the war on terror. 
Policy-Making and Terrorism 
Beyond just the usage of the term to attract attention (and perhaps dollars) is the fact that the 
politicking itself is linked to actual political action, i.e., policy on terrorism. Certainly the way a 
given state or administration defines the term will affect its policy actions in this arena. For the 
purposes of this paper, for example, the manner in which the two cases fits into the same 
discussion has to do with policy definitions in the wars on terror drugs. 
Such policies manifest as military action, domestic security, international aid, and a host of other 
governmental actions. Despite whatever issues of political rhetoric or whatever problems of 
definition one may wish to cite, there is no doubt that especially in the post-September 11th world 
that terror-related public policy is quite significant. Further, since it is clearly on the minds of U.S. 
policy-makers, there is no denying its global salience. 
Two Cases: Colombia and Afghanistan 
How then, do the cases of Colombian and Afghanistan fit into this discussion? In simple terms 
they are both subjects of U.S. foreign policy in both the WoD and the WoT. Further, a comparison 
of the cases is useful in illustrating the tension between academic and political definitions of 
terrorism, which in turn have important policy implications for both counter-narcotics and counter-
terrorism policy formulation. 
 
Fitting the Cases into the Discussion 
The two cases came onto the radar screen of U.S. policy-makers for different reasons and their 
relationship to the two wars is different. The basic tie-ins of the cases are as follows. 
In Colombia the relationship between drugs and terrorism started with the drugs. Indeed, the 
concept and presence of extensive political violence in Colombia substantially predates the 
current global concern with terrorism. It isn’t hyperbole to state that political violence, normally on 
a national scale, has been a part of Colombian political history since its independence from Spain 
in the mid-19th Century. Illicit drugs become relevant to the story starting in the 1970s, but did not 
become central until the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of a direct connection between armed groups 
that have been labeled “terrorists” the maturation of that connection did not take place until well 
into the 1990s and not officially (in terms of State Department classification) until after 9/11. 
In fact, it really isn’t until post-9/11 that we find a rhetorical connection between narcotics trade 
and terrorism in the Colombian context. This connection is instructional both in terms of the 
aforementioned political and policy definitions of terrorism. The public pronouncements of both 
President Bush and also President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia underscore this reality.[7] 
More specifically: prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. policy towards Colombia was one 
of separating the Colombian state’s war with the guerrillas and their struggle with drug traffickers. 
It was standing policy that the considerable amount of U.S. aid going to Colombia could be spent 
on the drug war only, not in the guerrilla war. 
This policy, and the post-9/11 shift, is well illustrated by statements by U.S. Ambassadors to 
Colombia in 1997 and 2002. In 1997, Ambassador Myles Frechette stated in a cable to 
Washington: “There will be no U.S. government assistance for fighting the guerrillas” while 
roughly five years late, Ambassador Anne Patterson told an audience in Colombia that “the U.S. 
strategy is to give the Colombian government the tools to combat terrorism and narcotrafficking, 
two struggles that have become one. To fight against narcotrafficking and terrorism, it is 
necessary to attack all links of the chain simultaneously.”[8] The post-9/11 language in 
Ambassador Patterson’s statement is stark, and the policy implications are quite clear. The 2002 
Supplemental Appropriations Act allowed for the usage of counter-narcotics funds to be used for 
counter-insurgency programs in Colombia. And it is certainly the case that the administration of 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe (2002 to 2006) has used the rhetoric of terrorism far more 
post-9/11 than any Colombian administration in the past. 
The chief concern of U.S. policy-makers in Afghanistan was, and remains, terrorism. Afghanistan 
had been in the control of a pro-terror regime (the Taliban), which had harbored al Qaeda and 
Osama bin Laden, who used the country as a training and staging ground. It was the linkage of 
the Afghan government to al Qaeda and the events of September 11, 2001 that led to the U.S. 
invasion and to the current level of aid being poured into the country. While opium poppies have 
long been cultivated in Afghanistan, that cultivation was not a sufficient reason for U.S. 
intervention (although crop eradication in Afghanistan was a stated goal of U.S. policy). However, 
in the aftermath of the Taliban, and the desire by the U.S. government to see the Karzai 
administration’s success, the issue of what to do about the burgeoning cultivation of opium 
poppies is becoming a key issue for U.S. policy-makers. 
As such, for the purposes of “colliding” wars, it is the war on drug that has collided with the war on 
terror in the Afghan case and the war on terror that has collided with the war on drugs in the 
Colombian case. 
Table One details a basic comparison between the two cases in terms of the war on drugs and 
three modes of addressing terrorism as noted above: the academic, the political and policy. 
Table 1: Comparing Afghanistan and Colombia in the Two Wars 
  
The Specifics of Colombia 
As already noted, collective political violence is nothing new to Colombia, being a phenomenon 
that reaches back over a century and a half. However, the synergy between illicit narcotics and 
violence in that country is only a few decades old, only having fully manifested itself since the 
1990s.[11] Indeed, while Marxist guerrillas have been fighting in Colombia since the early 1960s 
(some of which having origins in the civil wars of the 1950s), the connection between guerrillas 
and cocaine especially (also heroin) emerged in the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the near disappearance of not only the argument that Marxism presented a viable alternative 
to Western-style capitalism, but also any source of outside aid. So, unlike similar groups in places 
like El Salvador, where guerrillas eventually fought the state to a standstill, which led to a 
negotiated settlement, Colombian guerrillas had a way to continue to fund their fight. Via either 
“taxing” the lands of drug lords, or by directly participating in drug trafficking, groups in Colombia 
have demonstrated how connection to a narco-economy can lead to that group’s self-
perpetuation. 
The Colombian situation presents three groups on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist 
organizations,[12] all of which are known to generate revenue from drug trafficking: the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC). That a political economy of violence has 
emerged in Colombia is indisputable—what Nazhi Richani has called a “war system.”[13]  
The FARC and ELN were originally Marxist guerrillas in the classic mode, seeking the overthrown 
of the Colombian state. Yet with the collapse of the, the guerrillas have turned to other sources of 
support: specifically the illicit narcotics trade, kidnapping, extortion and so forth. The guerrilla 
revenue stream is broken down by Alfredo Rangel Suarez as follows: 
It is estimated that the income of the Colombian guerrillas may be as high as US$600 million 
dollars a year, or over US$1.5 million dollars a day Out of this sum, nearly US$360 million goes to 
the FARC, amounting to three times the earnings of the Banco de Colombia, one of the country’s 
largest banking institutions; twice those of El Tiempo, publisher of the country’s most important 
news daily; over half the income of Bavaria, a prominent financial group; and exceeding by 
US$35 million dollars the sales of Celumovil, one of Colombia’s largest cellular phone companies. 
Broken down by source of income, 48 percent of the FARC’s revenues come from its involvement 
in drug trafficking, 36 percent from extortion, 8 percent from kidnapping, 6 percent from cattle 
theft, and the remainder from robbery of financial institutions and other sources. The ELN obtains 
60 percent of its income through extortion, 28 percent from kidnapping, 6 percent from drug 
trafficking and 4 percent from cattle theft.[14] 
Some estimates place FARC drug revenues alone to be as high as $600 million per annum.[15] 
The paramilitaries are a different type of organization than the leftist insurgents, as the “self-
defense groups” ostensibly formed to counter-act guerrilla violence.[16] While not an inaccurate 
description, it is an incomplete one. While the concept of peasants and farmers arming to protect 
their property (both in legal and illegal militias) is a long-standing practice in Colombia, the 1980s 
saw the creation of more organized groups, many of which had ties to drug cartels.[17] In recent 
years the main organization in this category has been the AUC, and which has also been linked 
to the drug trade.[18] 
The Colombian case gives us special pause for thought: do the activities of armed groups there 
foreshadow a model for jihadists who could conceivably create financially self-sustaining 
operations? It is certainly a model that worked for Peru’s Shining Path for a time.[19] 
The Specifics of Afghanistan 
The cultivation of opium poppies in Afghanistan is a well-documented phenomenon.[20] Further, 
the obvious economic implications are clear. Less well-established is the exact interaction 
between these drugs and politics, at least in concrete terms. For example, establishing the 
Taliban’s exact relationship to opium cultivation and the heroin trade are murky. Further, the long-
term consequences of heroin-driven economies during an age of terrorism have not been fully 
explored. 
However, it is clear that the Colombian case is highly suggestive of a model that could be 
exploited by groups seeking to fund political violence. Further, the underground nature of the illicit 
drug trade and that of terrorist groups is one that creates natural intersections. Certainly it is not a 
particularly difficult leap to presuppose that groups willing to engage in the suicide bombings of 
civilians would be willing to allow the heroin trade to fund their activities. So while some of the 
evidence of this connection is circumstantial in nature, the preponderance of the evidence is 
persuasive. 
Looking Back: The Taliban, Opium and Terrorism 
That the Taliban was enriched by the opium trade is clear, as they taxed both the cultivation of 
opium poppies (until they banned the practice in 2000) and the opium trade itself, which was 
never banned even once cultivation was declared illegal. Indeed, reports state the Taliban taxed 
both the cultivation of opium poppies and the opium trade, at rates of ten percent and twenty 
percent respectively.[21] 
Questions exist as to the role played by the July 2000 fatwa issued to declare cultivation of opium 
poppies to be an un-Islamic activity. One theory is that the Taliban had simply not gotten around 
to dealing with this issue until 2000. However, the lack of a similar ban on the opium trade raises 
questions as to whether they sought to manipulate the price of opium. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt the precipitous increase in the price of opium after the fatwa 
was issued would have resulted in tremendous increases in drug revenue by the Taliban. The 
first graphic (Figure 1) below shows the cut in opium production, the second (Figure 2) 
demonstrates a radical increase in price—both are from the UNODC’s Afghanistan Opium Survey 
2004.[22]  
Figure 1: Afghanistan—Opium Production from 1980-2004 (Metric Tons)  
 
It is clear that the relationship between supply and price is quite strong. As such, governments 
willing to do so could very substantially affect the price of a commodity such as opium providing it 
could control production. Further, the market share of the crop by Afghanistan put the Taliban in 
the perfect position to do so, if, indeed, that was the goal of the Fatwa. The evidence suggests 
that the policy move was intended to affect price because the Fatwa did not make the sale of 
opium illegal and the government’s taxation of that activity continued after the Fatwa’s issuance. 
Source: UNODC: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, 4.  
The degree to which this directly aided al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden is impossible to know. 
However, in terms of circumstantial evidence is hard to deny that at least indirect aid redounded 
to the group given that the Taliban was indeed receiving tax revenue from opium farming during 
the time they acted as hosts to al Qaeda. 
Figure 2: Fresh Opium Farm-Gate Prices at Harvest Time  
 
Source: UNODC: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, 5.  
Additionally, other terrorist groups aside from al Qaeda, including Chechen separatists and the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may also have used Afghan opium/Taliban connections as a 
method of funding.[23] Suggestions that Kashmiri separatists may also be using opium to fuel 
their fight have also emerged.[24] 
Looking Forward: The Burgeoning Narco-Economy in Afghanistan 
It is as we look forward that the parallels with Colombia become quite stark. Indeed, the 
conditions for narco-economies in Afghanistan are even better than in Colombia. The control of 
the central government over national territory is less in Afghanistan than in Colombia, the 
prevalence of poverty far higher and the pervasive presence of warlordism are all factors which 
all lead to the promotion of cultivation. 
There can be no doubt that there is a substantial economic incentive for Afghans to grow poppies 
over other crops. As the Financial Times noted this is “an industry that employs 2.3 million 
Afghans and earned $2.8 billion last year [2004], equivalent to about 60 per cent of Afghanistan's 
legal gross domestic product.”[25] The story further notes that the crop “yielded about $4,600 per 
hectare last year, according to United Nations estimates—more than 10 times the income from 
wheat.”[26]  
Adding to the economic incentives, and drawing yet another parallel with Colombian coca, opium 
poppies require less water than traditional licit crops—a fact that further encourages cultivation in 
the current drought conditions in Afghanistan.[27] 
 
Implications 
The Dual Power of Markets and Poverty 
Both Afghanistan and Colombia illustrate the underlying power of the market that counter-
narcotics policies have to face. In both cases the farmer of either poppy or coca are often faced 
with a similar choice: cultivation of an illegal crop or starvation. 
In the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, this choice is especially stark. As noted above, the profits 
from illicit crops radically outweigh those of the licit ones. Such profits not only ensure survival, 
but lead to tangible benefits. For example: “In the last four years, said Abdul Rahman, 18, poppy 
provided his family with a motorbike, a television, an electric generator, a VCR and a CD player—
and a new house to hold it all.”[28] It is estimated that in 2003 poppy farmers earned 
approximately $1 billion dollars and traffickers $1.3 billion.[29] These are substantial number, 
when one considers that the country’s estimated GDP for 2003 was only $20 billion.[30] 
Similar economic conditions can be found in Latin America. For example, in 2002 peasants in 
Peru could sell coffee beans at $1.5 per kilogram, but coca leaf was going for $3.5 per 
kilogram.[31] Indeed, this marks a price spike in Peru, that is not coincidentally correlated to 
increased crop eradication in Colombia.[32] And, of course, the fact that coca paste has been 
reportedly used as currency (with local prices in grams of coca paste, not pesos) in the 
hinterlands of Colombia undercuts the adage that “money doesn’t grow on trees.”[33] 
This synergy of poverty and the laws of supply and demand create some of the greatest 
challenges for U.S. policymakers. On the one hand, stated U.S. policy is to drive the price of 
drugs up, so as to discourage users from buying. In fact, the ultimate goal is that the drugs would 
be made so expensive, that no one could afford to buy them. Of course, this creates what 
Professor Eva Bertram and her co-authors call “the profit paradox”—as the government seeks to 
drive the price of drugs upward in the hopes of stifling demand, the profitability of the production 
and sale of drugs increases.[34] So even if governmental policy is successful in driving up price, it 
does not have the desired effect of dampening the drug trade. Instead, it encourages it. 
As such, the cultivation of illicit crops used to produce illegal drugs may be unrivaled as a ready-
made source of funding for terrorist activities. 
The Policy Relationship between the Two Wars 
This situation clearly affects the behavior of the poor in the source-countries of the raw materials 
of these drugs: as price goes up, so too does the incentive of the peasant to cultivate the crops 
needed by the drug trafficker. Further, such situation undermine U.S. development goals in 
places like Afghanistan, where without economic development the success of the President 
Hamid Karzai regime is questionable, which in turn puts U.S. anti-terror policies in the region in 
jeopardy. 
The connection between terrorism and illicit drugs is not one that has been lost on the U.S. 
Government. To wit: the Office of National Drug Control Policy produced a series of commercials, 
which debuted during Super Bowl XXXVI in 2002[35] wherein the argument in made that 
Americans should think twice about purchasing illegal narcotics, as the proceeds from those 
sales often fund the activity of terrorist organizations. Of course, a flaw in the ad campaign’s logic 
is that a key reason why drugs help fund terrorism is because the war on drugs drives drug profits 
through the roof. This flaw underscores the degree to which one set of foreign policy objectives 
are being counteracted by another. And despite the fact that it is an unpopular thought, it 
underscores the need to evaluate U.S. anti-narcotics policies and the degree to which the actions 
of that government undermines its own policy goals.  
The there are several policy dangers here. First, there is now a clear incentive for bureaucrats 
and analysts to see every foreign policy and security problem as a terrorism problem. This 
induces the desire to pound square pegs into round holes so that funds and attention can be 
given to specific programs. It therefore can lead to misdiagnosis of policy problems, and lead to 
incorrect conclusions and actions. Second, as the government attempts to work in one policy 
area, it may be damaging goals in another. The daily fact that our policies radically drive up the 
price of illicit substances, thereby aiding those who sell them is indisputable. 
The bureaucratic response in the U.S. policy-making establishment is clear.[36] Just as anti-
communism was the key to understanding U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War period, anti-
terrorism has become the watch-phrase in the current era. If one wants attention and funding, the 
easiest way to get either to is to have one’s cause associated with the global war on terror. 
It is no coincidence that in the 2001 National Drug Control Strategy[37] (written prior to 9/11) the 
three references to “terror” were all aimed at domestic “street terror” yet in subsequent reports 
references are directed at the linkages between drugs and international terror. The FY2005 
National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary for example, contains 51 references to 
international terrorism/terror.[38]  
Given that resources are finite, one wonders as to the wisdom of the grand expenditures devoted 
to the WoD when not only does that mean that those resources are not necessarily contributing to 
the WoT, but that, in fact, that drug war logic leads to the radically inflated prices of substances 
such as heroin and cocaine, which, in turn help fund political violence. Rather than these two 
“wars” working in concert, the argument can be made that the War on Drugs actually hampers the 
War on Terror by making illicit drugs an amazingly profitable funding source. This is especially 
troubling when we note that the actual success of the WoD is questionable. 
This cycle is clear in Colombia. There has been a substantial amount of money expended in crop 
eradication in Colombia, to measurable success in terms of hectares under cultivation. However, 
the degree to which price has been affected in negligible. For example, despite over a billion 
dollars spent on anti-drug activities in Colombia in recent years, which has led to a reduction in 
coca under cultivation, the actual price of cocaine has remained quite steady. In other words, the 
massive crop eradication policies of the past two Colombian administrations have had a minimal 
effect on the cocaine industry while simultaneously leading to greater escalation of the violence in 
that state. 
The efficacy of interdiction dollars is an issue that is rarely discussed by U.S. policymakers, as 
they would prefer to focus on the question of hectares under cultivation. If one consults the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy’s web site, one finds that from 1994 to 2003, the U.S. government 
spend an average of $718 million per annum on international aid towards drug eradication and an 
average of $1.8 billion per annum on interdiction.[39] The goal, of course, was to decrease supply 
on U.S. streets and to further inflate the price, so as to discourage consumption. However, as the 
following graph (Figure 3) from the Colombia Coca Survey for 2003[40] compiled by the United 
Nation’s office on Drugs and Crime, the price of cocaine has been quite steady during that same 
period (and note: the dollars expended by the United States on international aid tripled from 1994 
to 2003 and spending on interdiction almost doubled—with the 1999 to 2003 period being one of 
substantial outlays. 
Further, if we consider that while there have been crop eradication successes in Bolivia, Peru and 
Colombia during this period, it is also the case that these changes in cultivation tend to only have 
small overall effects on the total coca crop, but rather demonstrate the Balloon Effect: when 
cultivation is reduced in one location, it tends to simply move to another locale—like what 
happens when one squeezes the air in a balloon, which just moves the air from one part of the 
balloon to another. 
Figure 3: Cocaine Prices for 2003 (US$/kg)  
 
Source: UNODC’s Colombia Coca Survey for 2003, 47. 
Figure 4: Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, 1994-2003  
 
Source: UNODC’s Colombia Coca Survey for 2003, 12. 
Not only does the Colombian case provide a potential model for the propagators of violence to 
fund their activities, the failure of crop eradication to actually affect the supply and price of 
cocaine should provide an advisory to those who would pursue similar polices in Afghanistan.[41] 
Ultimately the collision of these two “wars” may lead, on the one hand, to increased violence in 
Colombia because it has now been dubbed part of the WoT, while in Afghanistan, now part of the 
WoD, U.S. policy will likely make it easier for terrorist to fund their activities. In neither case is the 
intersection of these policies likely to further the ultimate goals of U.S. policy. 
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